CSSClass-LaTeX - Willemstad

# Example — LaTeX CSSClass ## Code ``` --- parent:: [[ER2OWS-10-MOC_Willemstad]] cssclass: latex --- $\LaTeX{}$ is a document preparation system for the $\TeX{}$ typesetting program. It offers programmable desktop publishing features and extensive facilities for automating most aspects of typesetting and desktop publishing, including numbering and cross-referencing, tables and figures, page layout, bibliographies, and much more. $\LaTeX{}$ was originally written in 1984 by Leslie Lamport and has become the dominant method for using $\TeX$; few people write in plain $\TeX{}$ anymore. $ E_0=mc^2 $ $ E = \frac{mc^2}{\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}} $ > *Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit.* Sed venenatis scelerisque metus quis commodo. Quisque non convallis arcu. Praesent eget gravida ligula, at accumsan metus. Phasellus finibus id ex ac sodales. Donec et sagittis enim. Ut consequat neque at ullamcorper elementum. Nunc consequat ipsum nibh, eleifend feugiat ipsum venenatis et. In mattis lobortis elit id mollis. Proin semper justo eu neque volutpat accumsan quis eu dui. Maecenas et dui enim. Nam molestie eros vel nunc pellentesque maximus id rutrum nibh. Vivamus venenatis at leo ut elementum. Is $\frac{4x+2}{4}$ equivalent to $x+1/2$? --- | Age group | Yes | No | | --------- | ---- | --- | | test | test | | | test | test | | | test | test | | ## H2 ### H3 #### H4 <center>Game Theory, IPSA-NUS Methods Summer School</center> <center>Last updated June 17, 2017</center> **Course Description** This course provides an overview of game theory and its applications to political science. We start from the ground floor, assuming no prior exposure to game theory or mathematics beyond high-school algebra. Students are introduced to game-theoretic concepts such as Nash equilibrium, time consistency, and signaling. These concepts will be applied to examine a variety of political phenomena, including candidate competition, fund-raising, political posturing, and executive-legislative bargaining. While most of the applications of game theory that we explore will be political in nature, some of our applications will be drawn from the world of economics and every-day life. This course has three objectives: 1. The first objective is to introduce you to some of the more popular methods of solving games employed by game theorists. 1. Me, a game theorist? 2. The second objective is to provide the necessary background for you to both appreciate and critically analyze political science scholarship employing game theoretic models. 3. The third objective is to provide a lens through which to analyze current events and proposed reforms to the political system (e.g., campaign finance reform or the abolition of the filibuster). To get a broad overview of the game-theoretic concepts we will cover, you might take a look at Robert Gibbon’s “An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory,” published in the *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. **Dropbox** All course material other than the course textbook can be found in our course Dropbox. Please let me know if you have yet to receive an invitation to join it. **Course Book** The following book is required: - Martin J. Osborne. 2004. *An Introduction to Game Theory*. Oxford University Press. **Class format** We will meet from 9 AM - 1 PM. Class time will be used to introduce new material, group work, and going over selected exercises assigned in the previous class session. **Exercises** I’ll assign a number of exercises at the end of each class session. They range in difficulty from less challenging to more challenging. We will go over some of the more challenging problems in the subsequent class. While I will not distribute solutions to the assigned exercises, our textbook’s author (Martin Osborne) has provided solutions for some of the textbook’s exercises. They can be found `https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/igt/solsp6.pdf`. I encourage collaboration on the assigned problems in the afternoon study group sessions (2 PM to 4 PM in Room XXXX). **Exam** For those who register for the optional two-hour Methods School exam, the exam will be held on XXXX. The exam will be closed-book, closed-note, no calculators, and electronic devices off. Practice exams, many of which have detailed solutions, are in our shared dropbox folder. **Mathematical pre-requisites** There are no mathematical pre-requisites for the course. All the math you need to know to do well in the course is in Chapter 17 of our course textbook. That said, for one class of problems we encounter this semester (i.e., strategic form games with continuous actions), the solution is most easily found using calculus. However, as the textbook illustrates, one can use geometric methods instead of calculus to find the solution for this class of problems.[^1] **Advice about Learning Game Theory** My advice is the following: Take good notes. Read the selected chapters from Osborne before class. When reading, focus on the definitions and the illustrative examples. After class, re-write your notes and re-read the assigned readings, again focusing on the definitions and the key concepts. Time permitting, carefully work through a couple of the more involved examples in the textbook. Thinking like a game theorist takes a lot of practice. As such, it is normal to struggle when confronting a new class of games or solution concept. Sometimes it is just a matter of figuring out what a piece of notation means. Other time, the problem being analyzed is truly difficult or very abstract. That said, the key ideas behind game theory can be mastered with effort and lots of hard work. In short, if you find yourself struggling with the material, come and see me during our breaks or immediately after class. I will help in anyway I can. **Warning** The class becomes more challenging as we move along and so it’s crucial that you not fall behind. I’ll typically be available for 15 to 30 minutes immediately after class to help anyone who has any question. **Tentative Schedule**[^2] <center>Unit I: Strategic interactions in which players move simultaneously</center> *Session 1, June 19* Topics: Overview of syllabus, preferences, basic optimization theory, decision-making under uncertainty, strategic form games, dominance relationships Readings: Chapter 1, Chapter 17, Chapter 2 (pp. 13–35), Chapter 4 (pp. 146–150) *Session 2, June 20* Topics: Nash equilibrium, best-response formulation of Nash equilibrium, introduction to Mathics / Mathematica, Readings: Chapter 2 (pp. 35–50) *Session 3, June 21* Topics: Models of candidate competition, models of lobbying, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium Readings: Chapter 3 (pp. 70–76), Chapter 4 (pp. 99–120, 138–142), and Dal Bo “Bribing Voters”(pp. 789–792) *Session 4, June 22* Topics: Extensive form games, time consistency, and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium Readings: Chapter 5 (pp. 153–164, 164–180), Chapter 7 (pp. 205–213 and pp. 225–230) *Session 5, June 23* Topics: The “setter model” and its application to separation of powers, the hold-up problem, and origins of war Readings: Chapter 6 (pp. 181–187), Eskridge and Ferejohn “Article I, Section 7 Game” (pp. 523–543), Fearon “Rationalist Explanations of War”, Shotts “Political Risk as a Hold-Up Problem” *Session 6, June 26* Strategic games with imperfect information Readings: Chapter 9 (pp. 273-313) *Session 7, June 27* Topics: Extensive games with imperfect information, weak sequential equilibrium Readings: Chapter 10 (pp. 313–336) *Session 8, June 28* Topics: Signaling games, job-market signaling, political posturing, trustee models of policymaking Readings: Chapter 10 (pp. 331–343), Gerson and Stephenson “Over-Accountability” (pp. 185-209), Fox and Stephenson “The Welfare Effects of Minority-Protective Judicial Review” *Session 9, June 29* Topics: Repeated games Readings: Chapter 14, Stephen Morris “Political Correctness” *Session 10, June 30* Topics: Applications of repeated games and models of long-run reputation Possible Readings: McGillivray and Smith “Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-Specific Punishment,” Milgrom, North and Weingast “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs,” Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Rafael Di Tella “Reputation and Threats when Transfers are Available” [^1]: We’ll also see how one can easily check one’s analysis using Mathics, which is free and uses the same programming language as Wolfram’s Mathematica, software which is widely used in academia and finance [^2]: I may update this schedule depending on how fast or slow we go. And I may also update the assigned journal articles, which all can be found in our Dropbox, based upon our pace and student interests. ``` --- ## Display --- parent:: [[ER2OWS-10-MOC_Willemstad]] cssclass: latex --- $\LaTeX{}$ is a document preparation system for the $\TeX{}$ typesetting program. It offers programmable desktop publishing features and extensive facilities for automating most aspects of typesetting and desktop publishing, including numbering and cross-referencing, tables and figures, page layout, bibliographies, and much more. $\LaTeX{}$ was originally written in 1984 by Leslie Lamport and has become the dominant method for using $\TeX$; few people write in plain $\TeX{}$ anymore. $ E_0=mc^2 $ $ E = \frac{mc^2}{\sqrt{1-\frac{v^2}{c^2}}} $ > *Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit.* Sed venenatis scelerisque metus quis commodo. Quisque non convallis arcu. Praesent eget gravida ligula, at accumsan metus. Phasellus finibus id ex ac sodales. Donec et sagittis enim. Ut consequat neque at ullamcorper elementum. Nunc consequat ipsum nibh, eleifend feugiat ipsum venenatis et. In mattis lobortis elit id mollis. Proin semper justo eu neque volutpat accumsan quis eu dui. Maecenas et dui enim. Nam molestie eros vel nunc pellentesque maximus id rutrum nibh. Vivamus venenatis at leo ut elementum. Is $\frac{4x+2}{4}$ equivalent to $x+1/2$? --- | Age group | Yes | No | | --------- | ---- | --- | | test | test | | | test | test | | | test | test | | ## H2 ### H3 #### H4 <center>Game Theory, IPSA-NUS Methods Summer School</center> <center>Last updated June 17, 2017</center> **Course Description** This course provides an overview of game theory and its applications to political science. We start from the ground floor, assuming no prior exposure to game theory or mathematics beyond high-school algebra. Students are introduced to game-theoretic concepts such as Nash equilibrium, time consistency, and signaling. These concepts will be applied to examine a variety of political phenomena, including candidate competition, fund-raising, political posturing, and executive-legislative bargaining. While most of the applications of game theory that we explore will be political in nature, some of our applications will be drawn from the world of economics and every-day life. This course has three objectives: 1. The first objective is to introduce you to some of the more popular methods of solving games employed by game theorists. 1. Me, a game theorist? 2. The second objective is to provide the necessary background for you to both appreciate and critically analyze political science scholarship employing game theoretic models. 3. The third objective is to provide a lens through which to analyze current events and proposed reforms to the political system (e.g., campaign finance reform or the abolition of the filibuster). To get a broad overview of the game-theoretic concepts we will cover, you might take a look at Robert Gibbon’s “An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory,” published in the *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. **Dropbox** All course material other than the course textbook can be found in our course Dropbox. Please let me know if you have yet to receive an invitation to join it. **Course Book** The following book is required: - Martin J. Osborne. 2004. *An Introduction to Game Theory*. Oxford University Press. **Class format** We will meet from 9 AM - 1 PM. Class time will be used to introduce new material, group work, and going over selected exercises assigned in the previous class session. **Exercises** I’ll assign a number of exercises at the end of each class session. They range in difficulty from less challenging to more challenging. We will go over some of the more challenging problems in the subsequent class. While I will not distribute solutions to the assigned exercises, our textbook’s author (Martin Osborne) has provided solutions for some of the textbook’s exercises. They can be found `https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/igt/solsp6.pdf`. I encourage collaboration on the assigned problems in the afternoon study group sessions (2 PM to 4 PM in Room XXXX). **Exam** For those who register for the optional two-hour Methods School exam, the exam will be held on XXXX. The exam will be closed-book, closed-note, no calculators, and electronic devices off. Practice exams, many of which have detailed solutions, are in our shared dropbox folder. **Mathematical pre-requisites** There are no mathematical pre-requisites for the course. All the math you need to know to do well in the course is in Chapter 17 of our course textbook. That said, for one class of problems we encounter this semester (i.e., strategic form games with continuous actions), the solution is most easily found using calculus. However, as the textbook illustrates, one can use geometric methods instead of calculus to find the solution for this class of problems.[^1] **Advice about Learning Game Theory** My advice is the following: Take good notes. Read the selected chapters from Osborne before class. When reading, focus on the definitions and the illustrative examples. After class, re-write your notes and re-read the assigned readings, again focusing on the definitions and the key concepts. Time permitting, carefully work through a couple of the more involved examples in the textbook. Thinking like a game theorist takes a lot of practice. As such, it is normal to struggle when confronting a new class of games or solution concept. Sometimes it is just a matter of figuring out what a piece of notation means. Other time, the problem being analyzed is truly difficult or very abstract. That said, the key ideas behind game theory can be mastered with effort and lots of hard work. In short, if you find yourself struggling with the material, come and see me during our breaks or immediately after class. I will help in anyway I can. **Warning** The class becomes more challenging as we move along and so it’s crucial that you not fall behind. I’ll typically be available for 15 to 30 minutes immediately after class to help anyone who has any question. **Tentative Schedule**[^2] <center>Unit I: Strategic interactions in which players move simultaneously</center> *Session 1, June 19* Topics: Overview of syllabus, preferences, basic optimization theory, decision-making under uncertainty, strategic form games, dominance relationships Readings: Chapter 1, Chapter 17, Chapter 2 (pp. 13–35), Chapter 4 (pp. 146–150) *Session 2, June 20* Topics: Nash equilibrium, best-response formulation of Nash equilibrium, introduction to Mathics / Mathematica, Readings: Chapter 2 (pp. 35–50) *Session 3, June 21* Topics: Models of candidate competition, models of lobbying, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium Readings: Chapter 3 (pp. 70–76), Chapter 4 (pp. 99–120, 138–142), and Dal Bo “Bribing Voters”(pp. 789–792) *Session 4, June 22* Topics: Extensive form games, time consistency, and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium Readings: Chapter 5 (pp. 153–164, 164–180), Chapter 7 (pp. 205–213 and pp. 225–230) *Session 5, June 23* Topics: The “setter model” and its application to separation of powers, the hold-up problem, and origins of war Readings: Chapter 6 (pp. 181–187), Eskridge and Ferejohn “Article I, Section 7 Game” (pp. 523–543), Fearon “Rationalist Explanations of War”, Shotts “Political Risk as a Hold-Up Problem” *Session 6, June 26* Strategic games with imperfect information Readings: Chapter 9 (pp. 273-313) *Session 7, June 27* Topics: Extensive games with imperfect information, weak sequential equilibrium Readings: Chapter 10 (pp. 313–336) *Session 8, June 28* Topics: Signaling games, job-market signaling, political posturing, trustee models of policymaking Readings: Chapter 10 (pp. 331–343), Gerson and Stephenson “Over-Accountability” (pp. 185-209), Fox and Stephenson “The Welfare Effects of Minority-Protective Judicial Review” *Session 9, June 29* Topics: Repeated games Readings: Chapter 14, Stephen Morris “Political Correctness” *Session 10, June 30* Topics: Applications of repeated games and models of long-run reputation Possible Readings: McGillivray and Smith “Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-Specific Punishment,” Milgrom, North and Weingast “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs,” Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Rafael Di Tella “Reputation and Threats when Transfers are Available” [^1]: We’ll also see how one can easily check one’s analysis using Mathics, which is free and uses the same programming language as Wolfram’s Mathematica, software which is widely used in academia and finance [^2]: I may update this schedule depending on how fast or slow we go. And I may also update the assigned journal articles, which all can be found in our Dropbox, based upon our pace and student interests.